



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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15 August 1988

Mr. Herman J. Obermayer
Editor and Publisher
Northern Virginia Sun
12227 North Ivy Street
Arlington, Virginia 22201

Dear Mr. Obermayer:

Judge Webster asked me to send you his editorial "Intelligence is Vital to Arms Control" for your "Otherwords" guest editorial program. I understand that this editorial will be run in the August 27th issue. We look forward to reading it.

I have also enclosed a photograph and biography of Judge Webster. The title under the picture should read, "Director of Central Intelligence."

The guest editorial program at the Northern Virginia Sun is impressive and encourages community participation. The Director was pleased to be asked.

Sincerely,

William M. Baker

Encl.

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Proposed Editorial for the
Northern Virginia Sun:
Intelligence is Vital to Arms Control

On December 8, 1987, after six years of formal negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty -- a treaty to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces. Intelligence played a vital role at every step of this historic process -- from 1977, when the Soviets began to deploy their SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, to this moment, as U.S. inspectors monitor Soviet destruction of these same missiles.

The nature and range of intelligence support to the arms-control process is unprecedented and increasing, yet not always evident to those who are not involved in the process. But those involved -- policymakers in the White House, the Departments of State and Defense, and other agencies -- depend upon intelligence to know the military capabilities and intentions of those who will sit on the other side of the negotiating table. The Intelligence Community describes for policymakers the current structure of Soviet military forces and makes projections for the future. Our assessments include Soviet incentives and capabilities to cheat on an arms-control treaty as well as a precise evaluation of our own ability to monitor Soviet compliance and to detect any possible cheating attempts.

Gaining U.S. objectives at the table depends upon knowing as much as possible about Soviet bargaining strategies and goals. It also depends upon knowing what propaganda and diplomatic efforts the Soviets are using to

promote their arms-control agenda in the international community. Such knowledge helps policymakers anticipate the effect that arms control can have on other parts of U.S. foreign policy, such as our relations with NATO allies.

Once a treaty is signed, it is presented to the Senate for ratification. The Senate then calls upon the Intelligence Community for additional information and support. During the ratification process for the INF treaty, CIA officers made about 30 separate appearances on the Hill to brief and give testimony.

In arms control, the ability to monitor compliance is the key to making a treaty work. The responsibility for monitoring Soviet treaty compliance falls entirely to the Intelligence Community. Our task includes developing and maintaining information on all Soviet weapon systems subject to treaty limitations and reductions. We collect and analyze intelligence from a broad range of sources, and we work to overcome any Soviet efforts at concealment, deception, or denial of information on treaty-related activities.

The INF treaty will abolish an entire class of nuclear weapons. Yet, impressive as this is, many more arms-control issues remain, including reducing strategic arms, eliminating chemical weapons, and strengthening already-signed treaties on nuclear testing. The role intelligence would play in supporting future treaties, especially in monitoring, is staggering. The INF treaty requires the United States to conduct inspections at 117 Soviet facilities. Monitoring the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty, which is now being negotiated in Geneva to reduce our strategic nuclear forces, could involve as many as 2,500 weapon locations spread throughout the Soviet Union. Keeping the peace has never been so difficult, so demanding, or so important, nor has the role of intelligence ever been more critical.